External Territorial Integrity in Tokugawa Japan
Case Study: Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands

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To speak of sovereignty in Tokugawa era Japan is somewhat of an anachronism. The concept is fundamentally rooted in the principle of territorial integrity, the *sine qua non* of the modern nation-state. The convention of demarcating explicit and absolute geographic borders did not become officially codified in Europe until the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, from which time it gradually infiltrated the nascent discourses of international treaties and trade negotiations. However, in order to overcome this temporal impediment, I propose to trace the shift in perception and consciousness of political borders, frontiers, and interactions throughout the Tokugawa period. The early seventeenth century worldview that Tokugawa Ieyasu envisioned was subsequently modified by the shoguns and bakufu officials of latter years in response to contemporaneous regional and global geopolitical exigencies.

This article will survey the changing perceptions of 'sovereignty' or external territorial integrity as a precursor to national unity, in addition to the way in which notions of sovereignty were mobilized for particular political, cultural, or economic agendas. This article will also interrogate and challenge the traditional "four windows" (Satsuma, Nagasaki, Tsushima, Matsumae) thesis propounded by David Howell among others.[1] I argue that the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands offer, if not a whole then at least a lens through which the bakufu's conception of sovereignty and territorial integrity can be examined. While the "four windows" role in girding the Tokugawa polity and geographical archipelago from foreign encroachment is widely accepted, these "windows" (of which I argue the Bonins should also be considered) tell a story of push- and pull-factors, a territorial tug-of-war, so to speak.

For ease of explanation, I have broken the Tokugawa period chronologically into three stages, in order to underscore the shift in perceptions of territorial integrity. The first, lasting from beyond the beginning of the seventeenth century until the 1790s, is chiefly characterized by a dominance of traditional notions of *kai-chitsujo* or *kai-shisō*, with either a Sino-centric or Japan-centric worldview, that I term the "*kai-shisō* period". When, however, increasing pressure from the north prompts the bakufu to revise the situation surrounding the Matsumae domain in *Ezo* in the late eighteenth century, an intermediary period, a "period of limited concern," in which the hitherto predominant notions of *kai-shisō* remains central to the bakufu's geopolitical worldview, yet the surfacing of reports of invasions and territorial encroachment by Russians start to trouble officials in the bakufu as well as the general public. The final stage, which I term the "period of treaty-based sovereignty," depicts the bakufu's perception of territorial sovereignty being grounded in Western-style treaties with its concomitant contretemps over extraterritoriality, cohabitation, and port-cities. It is important to note that in this final stage, starting in the early 1850s, the

kai-shisō paradigm has been completely supplanted by the Western-style treaties, and one bears witness to Japan's identification with the West in relations with its East Asian neighbors.

The *Kai-shisō* Period

Bruce Batton introduces the concept of state sovereignty in East Asia by citing Benedict Anderson in his study of "imagined communities". Anderson argues that:

> In the modern conception, state sovereignty is fully, flatly, and even operative over every square centimeter of a legally demarcated territory. But in the older imagining, where states were defined by centers, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another.[2]

The conception of porous and indistinct borders that Anderson speaks of in reference to Western nations has a similar counterpart in Asia, namely *kai-shisō*. This was the prevailing ideological worldview of the Tokugawa bakufu at its inception. Notions of *kai-shisō* (華夷思想; Chinese: huá yí sī xǐang) or kai-chitsujo (華夷秩序; Chinese: huá yí zhì xū) is a system of thought which Brett Walker describes as: "a two-tiered structure that viewed foreign relations as ceremonial meetings between the "civilized center" (represented by Japan) and a barbarian edge (represented by such groups as the Ainu)." [3] While Walker is discussing this system of foreign relations and international order within the specific context of the Matsumae daimyo and Ainu relations, it is an ideology that permeated all aspects of the bakufu's dealings with its foreign neighbors and trading partners. *Kai-shisō* is important for a number of reasons. To begin with, it encapsulates the centripetal characteristic of foreign relations and trade, as well as border (or frontier) demarcation. In its original form, the ideology placed China (the Middle Kingdom) at the center, with concentric zones of diminishing civilizational import as it becomes increasingly distant from that center. It was a Sino-ethnocentric vision of the universal empire that facilitated the incorporation of the contiguous states of autonomous yet "uncivilized" peoples. The Chinese civilization spread out in four directions from the center through the geographical spread of virtue (*de*), ritual (*li*), and law (*fa*).[4] The centripetal spatialization is best illustrated by the offering of embassy or tribute missions by vassal states to the center, the Chinese capital, constituting the quintessential and most emblematic feature of *kai-shisō* ideology. These tribute missions were reciprocated with the Chinese emperor's recognition and concomitant legitimization of said vassal state authority. It is important to note that the *kai-shisō* ideology was grounded in civilizational discourse, privileging the cultural over the geographic.

However, over time there emerges a number of modified self-referential versions of this political ideology in the Chinese periphery, notably Southeast Asia, the Korean peninsula, and Japan.[5] David Howell sees the development of a Japan-centric *kai-shisō* ideology as the fusion of two bifurcated worldviews. This Japan-centric *kai-shisō* "largely supplanted – and partially subsumed within itself – an earlier bifurcation of the world into "human" and "demon" realms, replacing it with the tripartite division in which previously demonized aliens on Japan's peripheries were humanized as barbarians and the realm of demons was displaced farther afield." [6] Brett Walker explicated this tripartite distinction between civilized center and two outer barbarian rings by citing the *Wakan Sansai Zue's* illustration of Ainu as

"inner barbarians," as opposed to Holland, the Philippines and England who were considered "outer barbarians". [7] An in-depth genealogical analysis of the emergence of the Japan-centric civilizational world is beyond the scope of this article, suffice to say that by the time Tokugawa Ieyasu is victorious at Sekigahara, it has been sufficiently established to the point that the bakufu deems it unnecessary and counter-productive to be incorporated into the Sino-centric *kai-chitsujo*. Ronald Toby's scholarship on Tokugawa foreign relations concurs with this assertion, stating that Asian relations were a "significant operative element in the legitimation of the new political order," [8] yet the "Bakufu could get along without direct relations with China." [9] Toby examines the consequences of Hideyoshi's invasions of the Korean peninsular in the 1590s, and subsequent efforts to reintegrate a unified Japan into the East Asian world order. Toby claims the diplomatic maneuvering by Japan in the opening years of the seventeenth century was part of a larger project to secure domestic political legitimacy through the acceptance of foreign embassies.[10] The restoration of Korean relations, and commencement of Korean tribute embassies, was seen as paramount to Tokugawa authority. Similarly, Satsuma's conquest of Ryūkyū in 1609, and subsequent beseeched embassy of King Shō Nei (1589-1612) to Edo in 1610, should, according to Toby, be seen as a practical step at solidifying bakufu authority within the strictly defined East Asian conception of international relations grounded in tribute missions, embassies, and *kai-shisō* notions of center and periphery.

Even the Dutch stationed on Dejima at Nagasaki were participants in the tributary practices, although their annual visits to Edo were understood by the bakufu to be merely an attendance with the Shogun. Robert Hellyer outlines the different tribute missions to Edo and the perceived role they played in legitimizing the Shogun as the bona fide suzerain of the archipelago. There was a clear hierarchy among the missions:

> [The] Korean envoys were treated as distinguished guests, feted at a banquet, and lodged at Tokugawa expense; the Ryukyuans, representing an inferior vassal state, received no banquet reception and were housed in the Shimazu's Edo residence; and the Dutch representing merely the private entity of the VOC, were even lower on the diplomatic totem pole. The *bakufu* permitted the Dutch to annually travel to Edo, where they presented greetings to the shogun, but did not allow them to engage in the state-to-state diplomatic exchange that was at the heart of the relationship between the *bakufu* and the Chosŏn court.[11]

The Japan-centric *kai-shisō* international system was, from the first mission to Japan by the Koreans in 1605 (Kyoto)[12] and Ryūkyū in 1610 (Edo)[13], underpinned by the tribute paid to the bakufu through attendance at Edo, and this solidified the East Asian world order through mutual recognition of suzerainty. Thus, in the early Tokugawa era, it seems apparent that despite the large number of Western ships passing through East Asian waters, the principle concern for the bakufu with regard to foreign relations was to establish their own legitimacy and authority as the center of the Edo-centred *kai-shisō* ideology.

From the mid-sixteenth century, the East Asian world order, with its competing spheres of

influence and civilizational centers, was increasingly being intruded upon by European and later American ships that traversed the seas off the coast of China. Yet this encroachment did not, at first, disrupt or overwhelm the already flourishing East Asian trade networks, but rather integrated itself into the extant political and diplomatic order. The Dutch, for example, are noted as not only paying tribute to the bakufu, but also the Chinese Ming and Qing emperors.[14] In his monograph, *Defining Engagement*: *Japan and Global Contexts 1640-1868*, Hellyer asserts that the seventeenth and eighteenth century bakufu considered trade with the Europeans as secondary to the trade with the Chinese, citing the seldom recognized fact that in the 1600s "much silver from South America, as well as from Japan, ended up in China, demonstrating that during this early globalization, China functioned as a center of the world economy." [15] Hellyer maintains that the bakufu, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century, was primarily interested in "Chinese medicines and Southeast Asian medicinal goods imported via the China market." [16]

It is within this diplomatic and trade climate that an introduction of the Bonin or Ogasawara Islands is necessary. The islands are both subtropical and tropical, and the popularized English nomenclature is derived from *bunin*, an archaic reading of *mujin* (無人), meaning "uninhabited" . In contemporary Japan, the Bonin Islands are incorporated into the municipality of Tokyo, and are located some 1,000 kilometers directly south of the capital. The Bonin Islands were first discovered in 1670 when a ship transporting oranges from Kishū to Edo was blown off course and drifted ashore there. Five years later, in 1675, "Shimaya Ichizaemon explored them under orders from the shogunate, and they were confirmed as a territory of Japan." [17] Despite claiming the uninhabited islands as Japanese territory, the islands themselves were left abandoned for virtually 180 years. Yet on the mainland, the islands began to cause a stir in 1727 when a masterless samurai calling himself Ogasawara Kunai Sadatō filed a petition to the bakufu for travel to the islands on the basis of his claim that one of his own ancestors, Ogasawara Sadayori, had discovered the islands in 1593. "This petition for passage was initially granted, but eight years later in the year Kyōhei 20 (1735) the claim that there was someone named Ogasawara Sadayori who had discovered the Bonin Islands was exposed as having no basis in fact, and its author, Sadatō was put into strict exile." [18] The Bonin Islands, while arousing the interest of a few seafaring individuals, did not raise concerns in the bakufu as there was no possible way these uninhabited island chains could be incorporated into the contemporary world view, that of *kai-shisō*. As there were no islanders to pay tribute to the shogun, the islands were thus deemed inconsequential to bakufu foreign policy.

Period of Limited Concern

Ronald Toby claims the anti-Catholic policies the bakufu promulgated in the 1630s were an attempt at the preservation of three independent conditions: Japanese security, Japanese sovereignty, and Tokugawa legitimacy.[19] However, when considering issues such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, one must also consider the events occurring in the wider region before limiting the discussion to the threat posed by just the Europeans. In the 1630s, whilst the bakufu was still in the process of negotiating the

exact wording of diplomatic documents with the Koreans, Korea itself was under attack from the "rising Manchu forces on her northern border", and thus was in "no position to risk diplomatic disputes with Japan" [20]. This was not the only news of wars and invasions that came into the bakufu's hands and could have roused fears of territorial infringement. For example, the subsequent Manchu conquest of Ming China in 1644 led Hayashi Bazan in 1654 to warn that a "Manchu invasion was imminent and [he decried a] lack of defense preparations." [21] Yet, the Manchu invasion of Japan was not forthcoming and in 1655 the bakufu, through the domain of Satsuma, had Ryūkyū formally establish tribute relations with Qing "in part to avoid giving Qing any reason for military action against Japan." [22] It was not, however, until the late eighteenth century that these fears of foreign incursion prompted the bakufu into actively seize territory in an attempt to counter the perceived threat.

The threat that carried the most weight in reshaping bakufu attitudes towards territorial integrity was that from the north. Russia loomed large in late eighteenth century foreign relations as reports of ships passing along the Kuriles into the waters around Ezo were intermittently passed on to the bakufu in Edo. 1771 marks the beginning of such insinuations to Russia's southward advance. In that year, Baron Moritz Aladar von Benyowsky landed in, among other places, Satsuma with messages for the Dutch declaring that: "Russia had fortified the Kuriles and was planning to attack Matsumae." [23] Despite the fact that this message was actually intended for the Dutch on Dejima at Nagasaki, word found its way to the bakufu and "caused in the last quarter of the century great consternation over a possible Russian threat from the north." [24] Despite this perceived threat, Wakabayashi notes that until the early 1790s, a number of European ships were landing on Japanese soil and hospitably provided with food, water, and firewood. The envoy that appears to up the ante was that of Adam Laxman in 1792. Laxman made the first serious challenge to Dutch monopoly over trade when he landed in Ezo and the then head of the bakufu, Matsudaira Sadanobu, "was willing to open a port to Russian trade in Ezo temporarily, as a way of keeping the Russians from coming to Edo Bay and discovering the lack of Japanese defenses." [25] Wakabayashi contends that, rather than acting as a vice to wedge open the so-called "closed" country as is often propounded, the envoy of Adam Laxman acted to catalyze the "closing" process. In response to the petition lodged by Laxman, Sadanobu's replies in 1793 establish "national isolation and the armed expulsion of Westerners as time-honored bakufu laws" when in fact there had been no such restrictions on trade and diplomacy. It had become, therefore, a convention established *ex post facto*.

Two years later, in *Chihoku Gūdan* (1795), Ōhara Sakingo wrote of the crisis facing Japan in the late eighteenth century: "All of them – the sagacious and stupid according to their callings and the high and low according to their statuses – are united in striving to expand their territory." [26] Wakabayashi posits Aizawa Seishai's *Shinron* (New Theses) as an attempt to formulate *jinwa* or popular unity and integration in response to this perceived threat. He "constructed *kokutai*, or what is essential to a nation, as the spiritual unity and integration that make a territory and its inhabitants a nation." [27] Aizawa and a number of his cohorts (most notably Ōhara and Hayashi Shihei) were, by the 1790s, well aware of the European colonial trend to annex new lands, though not necessarily by sending troops, in order to expand

their sphere of influence. With the events of 1792-3, Matsudaira Sadanobu's response to Laxman, and Ōhara's publication of *Chihoku Gūdan*, the bakufu policies of 1799 in Ezo become more comprehensible. In 1799, after reports of "secret" trade with the Russians came to light, the bakufu took the control of Ezo out of the hands of the Matsumae family, and took direct control themselves. Bakufu control over the Oshima peninsula led to the proliferation of bakufu power throughout much of Ezo. In fact, by "the end of the 1810s, southern Sakhalin peoples were well within the commercial and political orbit of Japan." [28] It is clear that the bakufu was taking the matter of territorial self-determination seriously, actively asserting control over what it saw as its jurisdiction over the "inner-barbarian" Ainu lands.

The late eighteenth century concern over territorial encroachment was not limited to Ezo and the islands to the north. In 1785, Hayashi Shihei published a text aimed at raising people's awareness of the geography surrounding the main islands of Japan. In this text Shihei warns of Russia's southward thrust, and encourages the development of land in Ezo. The text itself was titled *Sangoku Tsūran Zusetsu* or the "Illustrated General Survey of Three Countries". The three "countries" he refers to are Ezo, Chosŏn, and Ryūkyū, yet his inclusion of the Bonin Islands in his study was prompted when he "heard a Hollander's views on colonization during his studies in Nagasaki in 1777." [29] It is likely that the information Shihei utilized for the Survey was sourced from a copy of Ogasawara Sadatō's *Tatsumi Bunin Tōki* (Chronicles of Deserted Islands to the Southeast) on which the fabrication concerning his ancestor's claim to the islands was based. Not aware of this falsified account of the discovery of the islands, Shihei optimistically appeals for development of the islands, imploring: "It is hoped that merchants who are interested in new things will rise to the occasion, and if only such enterprises are developed, we could hold a myriad of advantages before our very eyes. Every effort should be made." [30] Despite Shihei's appeals for development of the islands, there was no Japanese who stepped foot on the Bonin Islands until Tenpō 11 (1840).

In early 1840, a boat owned by a man named Shōbee went adrift and came ashore at the Bonins with all seven people aboard. Westerners who had settled the islands ten years earlier rescued the seven castaways and this incident brought the islands back into the consciousness of traders and officials in Nagasaki. The motley of Pacific Islander, Danish, Italian, French, German, English, Portuguese and American settlers arriving and staying permanently on the islands in 1830 raised even more concerns for the bakufu.[31] The early 1840s also brought news of China's humiliating defeat to the British in the Opium War (1839-41), as well as "rumors of British plans to annex the Bonin Islands" [32]. Furthermore, in the fourth month of Kōka 3 (1846) an ominous message was delivered to the Nagasaki magistrate's office. The director of the Dutch factory at Dejima, perhaps in an opportunistic attempt to safeguard the Dutch monopoly on trade with Japan, informed the magistrate that although the Dutch were well aware of Japan's claim over the Bonin Islands, there were concerns over what they saw as Japan's abandonment of the islands while English and Americans colonized them. It stated that: "To abandon this territory, a crucial base of operations midway between America and China, would be to invite disaster at some later date" [33]. That "some later date" was a mere decade away, for by 1855 the bakufu had signed the first treaty

that specifically dealt with the most disputed of border regions, what is today called the "northern territories". The conclusion of this treaty with Tsarist Russia signified Japan's acceptance of the Western international system based on equal sovereignty of all states, and by default rejected the traditional East Asian concept of *kai-shisō*.

Period of Treaty-based Sovereignty

The story of Commodore Perry's "black ships" entering Edo Bay in 1853 is one well known enough to allow for cursory mention here, suffice to say that it was one of many foreign ships to call on Japan around this period, yet one that is probably the most historiographically significant. More significant to the study of territorial integrity and a growing sense of Western-style sovereignty is the United States Consul General Townsend Harris. If Harris' mission were to be summed up in two words, it would be "free trade". Yet in order for there to be free trade throughout Japan, the issue of the Tokugawa bakufu's limited authority surfaced. The bakufu was rankled by semi-autonomous *tozama* daimyo, and the lack of absolute borders, which meant opening the totality of "Japan" to "free trade" was arduous due to the lack of a totality. In particular, the northern regions around Ezo proved most complicated as it was still populated by indigenous "foreign" Ainu.[34] As such, the bakufu did not have complete control over the whole island, despite its strong resistance to Russian expansion. Similarly, the Ryūkyū Kingdom was still not claimed by Japan, despite the Satsuma daimyo's overlord status since the domain's invasion of the kingdom in 1609. Keeping Ryūkyū as a semi-autonomous tributary of both Qing China and the bakufu suited the bakufu as it could participate in the China trade and source information on China via the kingdom. This state of affairs is befitting the *kai-shisō* model of center/periphery, as Ryūkyū functioned as an "inner barbarian" tributary state. Yet, within the nascent discourse of international relations and Western-style treaties, both Ryūkyū and Ezo (as well as the Bonins as I will later argue) represented a grey area, not completely under the bakufu's control, and thus a site of conflict, misunderstanding, and possible altercation.

The new concept of state sovereignty also meant the bakufu needed to deal with internal borders. Although outside the scope of the current article, a brief discussion of domainal authority and varying degrees of suzerainty will illustrate the frustration over the inauguration of Harris' conception of "free trade". Hitherto divisions of daimyo domains and implicit hierarchies rendered the absolute demarcation of space necessary for a "modern" nation-state engaged in "free trade" problematic. As Michael Auslin reminds us: "Edo was the paramount power, and seemingly impervious, but fundamentally the bakufu was merely the house organization of the most territorial lord, the Tokugawa, and thus not a "national" administration in the way that the Meiji government was to become."[35] As Hayashi Shihei, Aizawa Seishai, and Ōhara Sakingo had beseeched since the 1790s, the bakufu must protect territorial integrity and the way to achieve this was to control Ezo and the Ryūkyūs, as well as Korea and the Bonins.[36] Never before had Japan's international boundaries been questioned so vehemently. The bakufu had mapped the main islands and had ended their jurisdiction at the

Wajinchi/Ezochi border on the Oshima peninsula in southern Ezo since Shukushain's War in 1669 (with later extensions).[37] However,

> Evfimii Putiatin's 1855 mission to conclude a maritime convention, one of a wave of post-Perry pacts, include a demand to settle the boundary between Japan and Russia. The second article of the treaty took up the border question and the bakufu found itself for the first time agreeing, at least on paper, to the definition of its lands.[38]

This is the historical moment at which I posit the *kai-shisō* framework as being supplanted by treaty-based conceptions of sovereignty.

As a direct corollary, Robert Hellyer notes that when the Japanese delegation went to Pusan in 1867 to mediate Korea's conflicts with the United States and France, they saw it as an opportunity to "build stronger ties with Western nations." [39] Japan harangues Korea over its violent attacks on French missionaries and French and American envoys and attempts to persuade Korea to heed Japanese warnings, and "abandon its mistaken ways and sue for peace". Hellyer, quoting Key-Hiuk Kim[40], recognizes that this "proposal represented the first instance of the bakufu identifying with a Western power rather than its Asian neighbors." [41] By this gesture, the bakufu had signaled their removal from the hitherto predominant *kai* defined worldview that, despite hierarchical in nature, tacitly tied lord to vassal state in a bond of solidarity, the vassal being protected under the aegis of the lord. According to a strict interpretation of *kai-shisō*, the bakufu would not have sided with the Western powers but allied themselves with the Koreans.

With the termination of the *kai-shisō* worldview, and the concomitant necessity to assert national sovereignty through territorial demarcation, the still unresolved "grey areas" of Ezo, the Ryūkyū Kingdom and the Bonin Islands required resolve. While Ezo in was annexed in 1869, Ryūkyū in 1879, the repossession of the Bonin Islands illustrates an interesting claim to sovereignty. By the 1860s, there was much confusion surrounding the sovereignty of the Bonin Islands. In 1860, the bakufu dispatched an envoy to America to exchange ratification documents for a previously signed treaty. While in America, the United States President Buchanan presented the envoy with five copies of "Narratives of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan," namely Perry's account of the expedition to open Japan to trade. According to this document, the bakufu learned that Commodore Perry called past the islands a number of times whilst navigating his passage from the Americas to Asia. It also details: "Perry's purchase of land for a coal depot from the people of the islands, and his exchanges with the British superintendant for trade at Hong Kong, Samuel George Bonham, over sovereignty of the islands." [42] This stirred the bakufu into action, for in early 1862, the bakufu dispatched the Kanrin-maru to the islands complete with foreign magistrate Mizuno Tadanori as head of the repossession party.[43] The fact that Mizuno was entrusted with this task should not be understated. Mizuno was "one the bakufu's top diplomatic hands," [44] stressing the importance of securing the islands as Japanese territory for both economic and security reasons. Upon arrival on the islands, "they induced all fifty-five residents, Westerners included, to pledge their fealty." [45] They issued title deeds for settled property, surveyed the islands and in 1863 the bakufu sent colonists from Hachijō-jima to set about developing the islands as a

territory of Japan. However, in the following year, due to the diplomatic crisis sparked by the "Incident at Namamugi," the bakufu feared British attack and subsequently withdrew all Japanese colonists. The "result was that the Ogasawara Islands were again left abandoned [by the Japanese] until the new Meiji government retook possession of them in 1876." [46] This vacillation of policy is indicative of the precarious sovereignty surrounding these islands, leading Japan to produce an even more fantastic argument for its claim to the Bonins.

The "discovery" of the Bonins posed a unique problem for the bakufu. The first recorded incident of Japanese visiting the islands was the ship that went adrift in 1670. Yet, this was not the earliest record of "discovery". Thirty-one years earlier, in 1639, in search of "islands of gold and silver" the ships *Engel* and *Graft* left Batavia and on July 21st the island now known as Haha-jima was sighted.[47] Presumably the Dutch explorers were uninterested in a group of islands that was obviously not the "islands of gold and silver," and as such news of this discovery did not generate much interest back in Europe when it was reported. Yet, this thirty-one year gap between the Dutch and Japanese "discovery" meant in order for Japan to rightfully claim sovereignty, their "discovery" needed to predate that of the Dutch. Additionally, the "British exploration vessel Blossam sailed into Chichi-jima in 1827 and highhandedly proclaimed the islands a territory of the empire" [48], and with the subsequent European, American, and Pacific Islanders settling the islands from the mid-1830s, the bakufu faced an uphill battle to prove the islands were in fact a territory of Japan. To this end, ironically, the Meiji government in 1876 invoked the falsified Ogasawara "discovery" story of 1593, the same story that was exposed as a hoax in 1735, in its "attempt to support its international territorial claims to the islands." [49] It is from that point the islands have been known as the Ogasawara Islands.

Conclusion

Issues of sovereignty did not end in the Meiji Era with the annexation of Ezo, Ryūkyū and the Bonins. Modern Japan and its expansionist project continually redrew the lines demarcating the edges of its empire. To complicate matters moreso, the end of the Pacific War in August 1945 left both the Okinawan Islands and the Ogasawara Islands ceded to the United States. Despite the Ogasawara Islands being returned to Japan in 1968 and Okinawa in 1972, the effects of this territorial to-and-fro has left its mark on both groups of islands culturally and linguistically.[50] To the north, the issue with Russia over the Southern Kurils is still not resolved. However, these disputes, cessations, annexations, and repossessions were all premised upon the demarcation of explicit and absolute geographic borders. Western treaty-based notions of absolute homogenous sovereign space gradually supplanted the earlier Tokugawa conception of *kai-shisō* as centripetal foreign relations in which neighboring vassal states offer tribute from the periphery to the central, civilized capital. In contrast, the latter, more centrifugal conception of sovereignty emphasized and necessitated the strict delineation of borders in what could be described as a sense of sovereignty proceeding in a direction away from its center and towards the clearly delineated periphery. Furthermore, the falsified "discovery," actual first landing, settling, reclamation, and final

annexation highlight the territorial tug-of-war that played out in the Bonin Islands. It was the shift in perceptions of how a state was constituted, what foreign relations entailed and engendered, as well as competing worldviews that precipitated the vacillating policies and practices surrounding the islands. Looking through the lens of the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands, an analysis of external territorial integrity accentuates the precarious state of sovereignty up until the mid-nineteenth century, and the bakufu's attempts to remedy that ambiguity.

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[33] Tanaka, "The Ogasawara Islands in Tokugawa Japan," p. 8
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[35] Michael Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004, p. 31
[36] Wakabayashi, *Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early Modern Japan*, pp. 68-76; Tanaka, "The Ogasawara Islands in Tokugawa Japan," p. 2
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[38] Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p.32
[39] Hellyer, *Defining Engagement*, p. 232
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[43] Ibid., p. 9
[44] Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism*, p.40
[45] Tanaka, "The Ogasawara Islands in Tokugawa Japan," p. 9
[46] Ibid.
[47] Long, *English on the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands*, p. 19
[48] Tanaka, "The Ogasawara Islands in Tokugawa Japan," p. 9
[49] Long, *English on the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands*, p. 21
[50] See: Long, *English on the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands*

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