

# SELECTED TRANSLATIONS OF YAMAGATA ARITOMO'S IKENSHO

[意見書 (Position Papers)]

## Part 1 : YAMAGATA ARITOMO'S SEIBAN IKEN [征蕃意見] (Opinion on the Taiwan Expedition)

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[Abstract] This paper considers the necessity for understanding the plurality of types on non-government papers, especially private papers. In private papers, there are many types of documents, such as letters, drafts of biography, drafts of speeches, dairies and poison papers. Especially, poison papers are important for historical researchers, because they are straight-forward statements of positions on issues. This paper took Yamagata Aritomo's position paper on opinion on the Taiwan Expedition to understand the role of position papers.

[KeyWords] Non-government papers, Yamagata Aritomo, Position papers, Taiwan Expedition, Meiji-Taisho History

### The Iken sho and Other Primary Sources

A general discussion of published and unpublished primary documents that are available to researchers on Meiji-Taisho political history is required to understand the crucial place that the *ikensho* occupies among Yamagata's papers. There are two basic categories of primary sources. The first is *Kobunsho* (公文書). We are here only concerned with the administrative records of the central and local governments, among which are the *Kobun Ruishu* [公文類聚 (cabinet records)] maintained by the Kokuritu kobunshokan [国立公文書館 (National Archives) of Japan]; *Nihon Gaiko Kiroku* [(日本外交記録) (Japan foreign affairs records)] kept at the Gaimusho Gaiko Shiriyokan [外務省外交史料館 (Foreign Affairs Documentary Materials Repository, Foreign Ministry)], and the prefectural and other local government entities that

maintain their own respective public records of offices or archives.<sup>1)</sup>

The other major category of primary sources is the *shimonjo* [私文書 (non-government documents)], the totality of papers related to individuals, associations, and enterprises [企業]. The *shimonjo* of individuals are known as *kankei monjo* [関係文書], such as the Ito Hirobumi kannkeibunsho [伊藤博文関係文書, HKM], containing documents such as *shokan* [書簡 (letters)], drafts of *jiden/jijoden* [自伝・自叙伝 (autobiographies)], drafts of *kaisoroku/kaikoroku* [回想録・回顧録 (memoirs)], drafts of *enzetsu* [演説 (speeches)], *nikki* [日記 (diaries)], and *ikensho*.

The primary source among the *shimonjo* that particularly excites the historian is the *nikki*. It offers what is most valued by the historian: a record over time, even granting gaps from lost, misplaced segments, deliberate erasures, and in-

ability to write a daily entry. Moreover, the *nikki* writers express candidly their most private thoughts and evaluation of the characters, personalities of others, the relationship among those they sketch, and the background and denouement of events swirling around them. The *nikki*, written in the sanctity of the study, with entries not shared with others except by the writers' leave, are therefore rich lodes for the historian.

The *ikensho*, on the face of it, does not seem to present many problems for the historian for they are straight-forward statements of positions on issues. They are known by many terms; among them, *kengi* (建議), *kengensho* (建言書), *joso* (上奏), *joshō* (上書), and *kempakusho* (建白書). There are two general categories of *ikensho*, whatever the terms used: one, those presented by people within the government; and two, those submitted from outside the government.

We must first make a distinction between the *shokan* and *ikensho* as tools for the researcher. Letters deal with the whole gamut of the human condition and experience, from the trivial to the consequential. They represent for the historian a wide range in their utility. The *ikensho* was expected to be read by more than one person and the care with which the authors prepared their *ikensho*, the insights they brought to their subject matter, and the manner in which they developed their arguments lifted the *ikensho* qualitatively above most letters and made them among the most useful of primary sources. Moreover, the very nature of the *ikensho* presented within the government being attempts to sway policies requires determining the writer's political agenda over time, his motives, stated and unstated, his place and role in the government, his relationship with cohorts, and the reasons for its ultimate fate.

It is obvious that the writers believed that what they had to present was important. One way they called attention to the contents was by writing it in *kaisho* (楷書). Writing in *kaisho* also minimized the misreading and misinterpretation of policy proposals they regarded urgent and significant. Moreover, the importance they attached to their views is evident by the emotionalism they reveal. For example, even making allowances for Kido Takayoshi (木戸孝允)'s well-known emotionalism, there is no gainsaying the strength of his conviction that Japan must adopt a constitution. After stating that "constitution and laws" were indispensable for Japan, he concluded his untitled *ikensho* with, "I have apprehensions about the future of [a Japan without a constitution]. I cannot keep these fears to myself. This is why I speak my thoughts and ask for your reactions." And in a memorandum written subsequently, he bemoaned the fact that his views had not been accepted and added, "because I so strongly believe in my views, I repeatedly state them."<sup>2)</sup>

Inoue Kowashi's (1843–1895) (井上毅) letter dated 26 August 1875 to Ozaki Saburo (1842–1918) (尾崎三良) and Takasaki Goroku (1836–1896) (高崎五六) on the kind of monarchy Japan should adopt is another example of great passion engendered over an *ikensho*. The three had held a discussion on the subject, and the strength of the emotionalism Inoue expresses is highlighted by the fact that Inoue and Ozaki were not only colleagues but *go* (碁) playing personal friends. He wrote that he had been perturbed and upset with the unexpected reprimand from the two for his position on the imperial system. He then wrote:

I earnestly believe that this subject goes directly to the heart of our constitution, and

so if my views are truly shallow, then I am guilty of a crime against you and the monarch. Let me therefore restate my fundamental position to make perfectly clear what I meant.<sup>3)</sup>

A revealing measure of the level of emotionalism that an *ikensho* can evoke is when such is expressed by someone not even associated with either the sender or intended recipients. Yamagata's, "Sambun Teiritsu ni Kansuru Shokan Ut-sushi Taisho Rokunen Ichigatsu (三分鼎立に関する書簡写 大正六年一月), is an example.<sup>4)</sup> This *ikensho* is discussed in an unsigned article, "Tegami o Tsujite-2 (手紙を通じて 二)" in *Jiji Shimpō* (時事新報), 1 August 1928. This means that the article was written six years after Yamagata's death in 1922. There is no question about the strong impact the *ikensho* had on the author:

To see the Genro Yamagata, who was over seventy at the time [he wrote this], exert so much effort to cleanse the political system is truly moving [(*mune o utsu*) (胸を打つ)].

### The *Ikensho's* Place Among Yamagata's Papers

The overall case for the importance of the *ikensho* among primary sources having been discussed, let us turn to the premier place it occupies among all of Yamagata's papers. We start with the letters found in the Yamagata Aritomo kankeimonjo [山縣有朋関係文書YAKM]. The number of letters in the YAKM is disappointingly small (just three volumes projected) when compared to the numbers found in the IHKM with eight published volumes (volume

nine contains letters discovered later and the index), and the Sinagawa Yajiro kankeibmonjo [品川弥二郎関係文書SYKM] with five published volumes and three more projected.

Yamagata also did not, apparently, leave a *nikki*. This gap in his papers can be placed in perspective by noting that the *nikki* of other Meiji first-line political figures—Ito Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru (井上馨), Matsukata Masayoshi (松方正義), Saigo Tsugumichi (西郷従道), Iwakura Tomomi (岩倉具視), and Sanjo Sanetomi (三条実美)—either do not exist or continue to frustrate the best efforts of scholars and archivists to locate them.<sup>5)</sup>

The lack of a Yamagata *nikki* is regrettable, but this sense of loss is magnified when other *nikki* that survived are discussed. One of the most, if not the most valuable political *nikki* is the *Hara Kei* (原敬) (1856–1921) *Nikki* [HKN] in 10 volumes, Tokyo, Kangensha, 1950–1951. Hara describes in detail and trenchant insight the political events of his day, the protagonists and personalities involved, and is not sparing in his judgments. Hara, moreover, clearly wrote with his eyes on history and he staked his political life on his *nikki*. In his will he instructed his wife Asa (あさ) and son Mitsugu (貢) to treat his *nikki* as the most valuable of his earthly belongings and to preserve it in perpetuity. He fully expected the *nikki* to be read by others, but only after several decades had elapsed. This is probably why he wrote it in *gyosho* (行書) which is easier to read than *sosho*.<sup>6)</sup>

His diary is absolutely indispensable in the study of Meiji-Taisho political history, especially the place of the Seiyukai (政友会) in this history. Mitani Taichiro (三谷太一郎) has been moved to declare that the *nikki's* excellence transcends time and national boundaries.

There are other *nikki* that deserve more than

passing mention because of their excellence as research tools as well as to underscore the gap in the Yamagata papers because of the absence of a Yamagata *nikki*. The *Ito Miyoji* (1857–1934) *Nikki*. *Kiroku—Mikan Suiso Nikki* (伊東已代治日記・記録—未刊翠雨莊日記), Tokyo, Yumani Shobo, 1999, seven volumes, ed., Hirose Yoshihiro. This *nikki* presents a contrastive perspective to that found in HKN. Miyoji was one of the drafters of the Meiji Constitution, and in the early 1890s was extremely close to Ito Hirobumi. Miyoji's "insider" position, therefore, lends unusual significance to his descriptions and analyses of political events and personages on the highest level. However, his *nikki* cannot compare with the depth, width, and detail found in HKN. Hara was, as noted, singleminded in his attempt to leave as full a record as possible of his attempts to make the *Seiyukai* the most powerful political force in Japan. He therefore wrote not only of his relationships, often conflictive, with leading government figures, but of the myriad problems involved in party building on all levels, and finally, on the issues and problems of governing.

*Suiso Nikki* suffers in contrast to the HKN for another reason. Miyoji seemed to lose interest in recording political matters when they did not concern him directly and spent as many, if not more pages, in writing of his great love, *bonsai* (盆栽). His *nikki* for all its value therefore is of uneven usefulness for the political historian. Moreover, it is interesting in the face of Hara's expressed wish that his *nikki* be preserved in perpetuity, that the *Suiso Nikki* in Miyoji's hand does not exist, and only copies (*shahon*) (写本) written neatly in *kaisho* are available. Historians owe a debt of gratitude for this to Osatake Takeshi (尾佐竹猛) who, as head of the Kenseishi Hensankai (憲政史編纂会) formed to com-

memorate the Diet's 50th anniversary (1940), took the initiative to have it copied. The original, including most of Ito Miyoji's papers, were burned during the air raids on Tokyo. Ito's papers relating to the Meiji Constitution were the only ones spared this fate since Miyoji's grandson Harumasa (治正) had sent them to the country for safekeeping on the ground that they constituted the most valuable of the lot.<sup>7)</sup> The value of the *Takarabe Takeshi* (1867–1949) *Nikki* (財部彪日記), Tokyo, Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1983, ed., Banno Junji, Hirose Yoshihiro, *et. al.*, lies in giving the Satsuma–Navy viewpoint, something that had been lacking in late Meiji-Taisho political history as well as in the fact that unlike Hara who did not keep a daily record, Takarabe made a special effort to do so, from the time he became an ensign to his death. The published version represents the years when he was navy vice-minister. Takarabe Minoru (財部実), in a conversation with me, recalled that his father, Admiral Takarabe would go immediately to his study and work on the day's letters and write the day's entry in *sosho* no matter what the hour, and even when deep into his cups.

The diary of Kuratomi Yuzaburo (1853–1948) (倉富勇三郎) deserves special mention. Kuratomi was a privy councillor (October 1920–December 1925), after which he served as Privy Council president until May 1934. He wrote daily in *sosho*, most of the time on both sides of standard notebook-sized sheets, in handwriting so tiny that someone described it as "words tiny as a fly's head." The average length of an entry is eight pages. He wrote 296 volumes from 1919–1944.<sup>8)</sup> I as a young archivist went to the Kuratomi residence to accept the diary for KS. I asked the widow how it was possible for Kuratomi to have written without fail over such a long period and at such great length. She said

that he went every working day to his office located near the Otemon (大手門) in the Imperial Palace. He always carried with him small pieces of paper on which he scribbled all the activities and conversations that caught his interest. The day would end at 2 : 00 p.m. after which he returned to their residence in Akasaka but a short distance away. He would then go to his study to write, thereby leaving for researchers a gold mine of information on the workings of the Sumitsuin [(枢密院) (Privy Council)].

The importance of the diary goes beyond the engrossing details Kuratomi provides. He was a privy councillor and later, president of the Sumitsuin when it turned from a passive state organ to one that took an active stance on state policy. Yamagata's long tenure as head of the Privy Council was marked by its passivity since it quietly accepted the drafts of laws, ordinances, rescripts, treaties, and other matters of state. This was because there was a *genro*, such as Yamagata who valued highly harmonious relationship and had a gift to generate a consensus among all key components in the government before any matter was submitted to the Privy Council for consideration. After his death (1922), no one was able to fulfill this consensus-building function. The result was that the Privy Council began to raise questions on the drafts submitted to it, thus heightening its visibility and influence in the government.

The *Ozaki Saburo Nikki* adds still another rich dimension to our understanding of late Meiji and Taisho political history by giving us the anti-Satsuma-Choshu pro-*kuge* (公卿), *kazoku* (華族), and House of Peers perspectives<sup>9)</sup> Ozaki's predispositions stemmed from his lifelong association with his mentor, the *kuge* Sanjo Sanetomi. His frustration at being relegated to the powerless Genroin that had been created (1875–

1895) as a sinecure for former nobility and retired bureaucrats also may have contributed to his animus. Another strength of Ozaki's diary is the detailed accounting that he gives on a wide range of subjects from education, taxation, local government systems, customs, transportation, to political groupings of places in Kyushu he visited as part of his duties as a Home Ministry bureaucrat.<sup>10)</sup> Ozaki probably intended that his diary would be read since it is written neatly in *kaisho*. It has been retained by his grandson, Ozaki Harumori (尾崎春盛) who has, however, donated all the letters and other documents to KS where they are catalogued as *Ozaki Saburo Kankei Monjo* (尾崎三良関係文書).<sup>11)</sup>

There is yet another lacunae in the Yamagata papers that underscores the importance of his *ikensho* in understanding him as a person and public figure. This is the dearth of *enzetsu* [演説 (speeches)]. Ito Hirobumi was a spell-binding speaker, and he has left a large number of speeches.<sup>12)</sup> Yamagata, according to Roger F. Hackett, even with a prepared text in his hands, was ill at ease, and his hands often trembled when he spoke.<sup>13)</sup> Therefore, other than brief policy speeches as prime minister and state minister, probably the only major public speech he made was his April 1919 speech, "Chohei Seido oyobi Jichi Seido Kakuritsu no Enkaku" (徴兵制度及び自治制度確立の沿革). Oyama Azusa included it in his *Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho* [山縣有朋意見書 Hara shobo. 1974] YAI (pp. 380–413), which is a puzzling matter, since it is clearly a speech and not an *ikensho*, and it already had been published in *Meiji Kensei Keizaishiron* (『明治憲政経済史論』), Tokyo, Kokka Gakkai, 1919, pp. 375–431. He did so perhaps as a "filler" to increase the volume's heft. Another possible reason may be the very rarity of a lengthy public speech by Yamagata.

## Yamagata the Person and Statesman and His *Ikensho*

Yamagata's forte therefore obviously was not speech-making. Fortunately for the historian, nearly every other character trait of his persona conspired to make him the premier writer of *ikensho* among Meiji politicians and statesmen.

Yamagata was by all accounts a man of uncommon intelligence who thought through problems in a highly disciplined, systematic fashion, one who took great pleasure in using his intellect. He had an inquiring mind that constantly sought to push forward the frontiers of his own knowledge on varied subjects. He did this by intensive and wide-ranging reading. It is believed that his personal library numbered more than 10,000 volumes. He also sought to expand the frontiers of his knowledge by direct observation. In the fall of 1921, his body wracked by illness, he went to Toyama Gakko (戸山学校) to look at new weapons that had been used in World War I and had only recently been brought to Japan. It was his desire to observe personally the latest in tall building architecture that led him to the newly built Mitsukoshi Department Store.

Yamagata was also a good listener. He listened to newly returned young and bright military attaches; he listened to scholars, captains of industry, literary figures, journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, bombarding them with requests for the latest data statistics, government reports, and studies. It is worth repeating that he was disciplined and rigorous in his thinking, and sought order, logicity, rationality, accuracy, and precision in his writing. He may have been mistaken in his views that sometimes were not taken seriously by his cohorts. Yet there is no gainsaying the intense effort he put into his *ikensho* as well as the smooth flow of his narrative

that came from the demands he made of himself.

Finally, through most of his lengthy and thought-provoking *ikensho* ran three recurrent questions: "What is Japan about?", "What is Japan's role and destiny vis-a-vis her immediate neighbors and the advanced nations of the West?" "What are the duties and responsibilities of Japanese to Japan, be they in the arena of politics, diplomacy, military affairs, society, culture, industry, economics, fiscal matters, or education?"

The number of Yamagata's *ikensho* goes well beyond that which is found in Oyama's YAI. The evidence for this is indirect and direct. YAI contains eighty-one memorials, admonitions, and *ikensho* (plus one speech); and of the *ikensho*, only seven are from the Taisho period. Yamagata undoubtedly wrote many more in the Taisho period. Irie Kan'ichi (入江貫一) (1879–1955), Yamagata's long-time private secretary remembers that he had personally "put in order fifty drafts [of *ikensho*] that Yamagata had sent to those in the government covering such subjects as military, diplomacy, industry, education, and fiscal problems." Den Kenjiro also recalls that Yamagata sent him lengthy "essays" on economics, the labor problem, universal suffrage, education, political parties, and so on.<sup>14)</sup>

The direct evidence is even more persuasive. Hara Kei recorded in his diary that at a cabinet meeting on 7 October 1919, Takahashi Korekiyo (高橋是清) (1854–1936) showed other cabinet ministers a *shomen* [書面 (letter)] he had received from Yamagata on the economic problems confronting Japan. The *shomen* probably was an *ikensho*. Hara also wrote that on 16 January 1920, he received from Yamagata an *ikensho* on education.<sup>15)</sup> And Yamagata, as he had done on other occasions, asked Hara to make copies of it for cabinet ministers.<sup>16)</sup> Hirata Tosuke (1849

-1925) (平田東助), in his letters to Yamagata wrote comments at the behest of the latter on *ikensho* that Yamagata had sent to him.<sup>17)</sup> Yamagata in his letters to Terauchi Masatake (1852-1919) (寺内正毅) and Katsura Taro (1848-1913)

(桂太郎) also specifically renders titles to *ikensho* he had written on Japan's China policy.<sup>18)</sup> There are two other examples of what may be designated as letter-*ikensho*. One is the letter from Yamagata to foreign minister Mutsu Munemitsu (1844-1897) (陸奥宗光) on foreign policy.<sup>19)</sup> Yamagata also sent his untitled *ikensho* on Japan's policy toward Okinawa as a *besshi* [(蔑視) (enclosure)] in a letter to Shinagawa Yajiro.<sup>20)</sup> There is no doubt that other letter-*ikensho* exist, but their discovery demands close and intensive reading of letters in *kankei monjo*.

The Kokuritusu Koubunshokan is another source of Yamagata *ikensho*. I managed to unearth several *ikensho* filed with other Yamagata documents.

The quality and number of extant Yamagata *ikensho*, in short, render them the most valuable and useful of the documents among his papers.

### Yamagata Aritomo's Seiban Iken [(征蕃意見) (Opinion on the Taiwan Expedition)], dated 8 July 1874<sup>21)</sup>

The choice of this *ikensho* to begin what is hoped will be a long-term commitment to publish in English a selection of Yamagata's *ikensho* is appropriate for three reasons. One, there is a clear trend among mostly young Anglophone scholars to delve into the rationale and conduct of Japan's relationships with its colonies. An indication of this tendency is Andre Schmid's biting review article in which he decries the woe-filled gaps in the studies by older Japan specialists. These are a blind-eye to what he regards as the

indisputable fact that the colonizing experience was central to Japan's modern history as well as for not confronting the reality that Korea occupied a pivotal place in this history.<sup>22)</sup>

Whether Schmid is on the mark on his criticism of those who had gone ahead of him, it is undeniable that there is increasing interest in Japan's colonizing experience. There are several articles devoted to aspects of this history in *Japan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy*, 1900-1930, ed., Sharon A. Minichiello, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1998 and in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, edited by Helen Hardacre with Adam L. Kern, Leiden, Brill, 1997. Taiwan has not been left behind. A team of Japanese researchers led by Hi-yama Yukio (檜山幸夫) and me, former from Chukyo (中京) University in Nagoya, are carrying out the task of cataloging the entire holdings of the Japanese Government General of Taiwan. So far, twelve volumes have been published as *Taiwan Sotokufu, Monjo Mokuroku* (台湾総督府文書目録), ed., Chuka Minkoku Kokushikan, Taiwan Bunkenkan covering documents from 1895-1907. The project will proceed until all the remaining documents from 1907 to Japan's defeat in 1945 are catalogued. In English, there is *Taiwan: A New History*, ed., Murray A. Rubenstein, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

Two, the Taiwan expedition of 1874 was the new Meiji government's first overseas adventure. In 1873, the new government had split over the question of invading Korea [(征韓論) (*seikanron*)]. Those who favored invasion believed that this would give vent to the disgruntled ex-samurai. The group opposed to the war won out, but when fifty-four Ryukyuan sea-farers were killed by Taiwanese aborigines, this provided the justification to send a small expedition to the island; although the real reason was

to mollify those who had been bested in the debate over invading Korea. The invasion failed, but because the Ch'ing government paid a repatriation to Japan, this act under Western law gave Japan legal claim to the Ryukyus, meaning that they no longer were China's tributary state. In this sense, Japan was successful. The consequence of the Korea invasion debate and Japan's expedition to Taiwan gave rise to the stereotype that Meiji Japan was from the beginning, a warlike, aggressive state. The *ikensho* puts to rest this notion, for just as in the Korea debate, the government was split, with a moderate faction that opposed the expedition.

Three, Yamagata as the founder of Japan's modern army, is also typecast as a bellicose, ultra-nationalistic expansionist. This *ikensho* clearly shows that he was moderate and cautious, traits that he revealed throughout his service to the Meiji-Taisho state.

### The *Ikensho* "Opinion on the Taiwan expedition"

From: Yamagata Aritomo<sup>23)</sup>

To: Generals in the army [(*shokan shokun*) 将官諸君]<sup>24)</sup>

8 July 1874

Recently, I have received from the prime minister<sup>25)</sup> inquiries about punishing Taiwan aborigines.<sup>26)</sup> Since you are aware fully of the situation in Taiwan, there is no need for me to here go into details. I replied to the prime minister as follows:

I have not been involved from the beginning in the deliberations on the Taiwan expedition,<sup>27)</sup> so I am unable to state the rights and wrongs of the action taken by the gov-

ernment. I am also unable to discuss the merits or demerits of remaining or withdrawing from Taiwan.<sup>28)</sup> Moreover, if we have to go to war with China, I cannot guarantee that we are capable of re-supplying the troops that need to reinforce the remnants of the original contingent. This is a matter for the cabinet to decide.

I would like to go into detail on what I have just said to Sanjo. From the point of view of what the army should be like, thanks to the efforts of my fellow officers since the Restoration, we have finally been able to see some semblance of a modern army. Still, we have not even come close to the goals we have set for the army. The officers are not yet fully trained. The same can be said for the soldiers. Our weapons are not yet up to standard. We have not even given thought about how we can go about defending Japan. I believe that it will take several years, with all of us daily exerting ourselves to the limit, and only then can we be absolutely confident that the foundation of Japan's military is established and Japan can be respected by all.<sup>29)</sup> I have been applying myself to these goals since my previous tenure as army minister.<sup>30)</sup> It would not be beyond the capacity of our troops [again] to move into Taiwan today, but if by this action, we were to have to fight a war with China, this would be an unspeakable misfortune. Therefore, I do not want to change my earlier opinion.<sup>31)</sup> This is what I have told the prime minister.

It may be said of me that as army minister, the army is fully under my jurisdiction; therefore [they say] you must make a prompt decision. If you decide to proceed, you must posthaste supply and support the army and show our flag in Taiwan. If, however, you should de-



cide to withdraw, then you must speedily get the emperor's sanction and recall immediately the remaining troops. To this I reply: Whether Japan goes to war or not is not the army minister's prerogative to decide. This is all the more so because in Japan's administrative system, the army minister does not have the right to assist directly the emperor.<sup>32)</sup> Moreover, I was not involved from the start in the deliberations that led to the decision to send troops to Taiwan; therefore, it would not do to thoughtlessly give my views. This is all the more so since I am not privy to the contents of the deliberations. This is why I am holding firm to what I have earlier proposed [in my July 1874 opinion]. Still, if by chance, one among you will advise me on what Japan should best do under the circumstances we face today, I would be not only pleased, but it would be good for Japan and the Japanese. This is what I truly believe.

Others are saying: You are the army minister. The Taiwan expedition is an accomplished fact, therefore, nothing can be done about it. If a major war suddenly should break out in [Japan's northern] periphery [that is with Russia], and you do not know what to do, then you cannot be said to be fulfilling your duties as the army minister. My reply to that is this: We are here talking about two different matters. One, it is impossible to foresee when wars or rebellions will break out. We are unable to predict when such calamities, disasters, misfortunes will occur, but should they erupt suddenly, I shall on those occasions perform my duties as army minister to the fullest extent. I shall mobilize troops and material, and direct all strategic efforts until I am killed in battle. Two, long-range peacetime planning for military development. This is of a different order of things from problems arising due to extraordinary developments. [On the

second point] should there be a conflict between my duties as army minister and Yamagata who possesses convictions and ideals, I will be true to my convictions.<sup>33)</sup> If I were to be commanded by the emperor to go to war, I shall, together with the generals (*shokan*), do my utmost to give battle, though I am without ability. [Still, as the emperor has not so commanded], I shall pursue my responsibilities as army minister based on my convictions: My convictions are as stated here and I do not intend to change them. I am sending you this "Opinion" because the prime minister has ordered me to do so, as stated in the enclosed written instructions. He asks here that I call a meeting of the generals (*rikugun shokan*) and hear your views. I have taken this opportunity to write down my long-held views and to give you a chance to react to them. This is a matter of grave importance to the nation, so I am hoping that you will meet with me and in the discussion, give me your opinions fully and freely.

- 1) An example of the prefectural *Kobunsho* is the administrative records of Okinawa including records compiled during the American occupation, and are found in the Okinawaken Kobunshokan (沖縄県公文書館). What is sometimes overlooked by researchers are the archives which hold the records of former colonial administrations, such as the *Taiwan Sotokufu Kobun Ruisan* [(台湾総督府公文類纂) (Taiwan Government General administrative records)], preserved by the Chukaminkoku Kokushikan Taiwan Bunkenkan [(中華民國国史館台湾文献館) (Historica Sinica, Historica Taiwan)] in Chuko Shinson (中興新村), near Taichu (台中).
- 2) Kido Denki Hensanjo, compiler *Shogiku Kido*

- Ko Den*, Tokyo Meiji Shoin, 1927, 2, pp. 1569, 1571.
- 3) The analysis, discussion, and translation of the *ikensho* are found in, George Akita and Hirose Yoshihiro, "The British Model: Inoue Kowashi and the Ideal Monarchical System," *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. 49, winter 1994, pp. 413-421.
- 4) The title is in Yamagata's hand, but the content is by a scribe in *kaisho*. A copy is found in *Den Kenjiro Kankei Monjo* (田健治郎関係文書).
- 5) Two of the three early Meiji political giants left *nikki* and their contents reflect well their respective personalities. Kido was expansive and eloquent who wrote about his relations with others, including geisha, his cultural interests, capacity for enjoyment, and tearful remembrances of cohorts, "seventy or eighty percent" who died in the pre-Restoration struggles. His output has resulted in a superb translation into English in three volumes by Sidney D. Brown and Akiko Hirota, *The Diary of Kido Takayoshi*, vol. one: 1868-1871; vol. two: 1871-1874; vol. three: 1874-1877, Tokyo, University of Tokyo Press, 1983-1986. Akiko Hirota is related to Hirota Koki (廣田弘毅) who was hanged as a war criminal at Sugamo. Okubo Toshimichi (大久保利通) also left a *nikki*, one that Brown has described as being "dry as dust." It is true that each entry by the taciturn Okubo is usually limited to where he went, whom he met and briefly, what they talked about. Nihon Shiseki Kyokai, compiler, *Okubo Toshimichi Nikki*, two volumes, Tokyo, Nihon Shiseki Kyokai, 1927. In short, Okubo's no-nonsense entries reflect his persona just as the flowing and colorful descriptions of drinking and other pleasurable episodes in the *Kido Nikki* tell us about Kido's. Still, for the historian the *Okubo Nikki* is invaluable, because his careful record of those he met and what they discussed, however briefly, can be used as a benchmark to check entries in other diaries. Moreover, a frequency count over time of those he mentions may suggest the contours of the Okubo faction in the early Meiji government.
- 6) HKN, Fukumura, 6, Appendix, p. 192. Fortunately for scholars Keiichiro took this admonition to heart. Kei had placed the diary in a box made from the camphor tree. Keiichiro took the box to Morioka and stored it deep in the recesses of the family go down. The diary thus survived both the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake and the spring 1945 fire bombings of Tokyo. Fukumura, "Introduction," p. 4.
- 7) The source for this is Harumasa, who was a journalist with *Mainichi Shimbun* (毎日新聞), as told to Okubo Toshiaki (大久保利謙) whom were with KS at the time.
- 8) *Kuratomu Yuzaburo Kankei Monjo*, Kensei Siryouaitu, National Diet Library
- 9) Ito Takashi, Ozaki Harumori, ed., *Ozaki Saburo Nikki*, three vol., Tokyo, Chuo Koronsha, 1991-1992.
- 10) Vol. one, 1996.
- 11) Takarabe and Kuratomu wrote in *sosho* that is particularly difficult to transcribe. Still, they also seem to have expected their diaries to be read. Takarabe's diary is the only item in the *Takarabe Takeshi kankei Monjo* and the Kuratomu diary forms the bulk of the *Kuratomu Yuzaburo Kankei Monjo*, a situation in both cases that compel attention to the diaries.
- 12) For example, *Kokka Gakkai Zasshi* (国家学会

- 雑誌), no. 124, 15 June 1897; *Kokka Gakkai Zasshi*, no. 154, 1899; and *ItoKoZenshu* (伊藤公全集).
- 13) *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838–1922*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971.
  - 14) In Irie Kan'ichi, *Yamagata Gensui Tsuioku Hyakuwa*, Tokyo, Kaikosha, 1930, pp. 212–213.
  - 15) This *ikensho* was also sent to Matsukata Masayoshi (1835–1924) (松方正義) on 20 January 1920. *Matsukatake Monjo* (松方家文書), Kensei Siryoshitu, Nationd Did Library, KS.
  - 16) HKN, 5, pp. 151–152; 5, p. 203.
  - 17) *Yamagata Aritomo Monjo* (山縣有朋関係文書), KS, dated 14 August 1919, and 19 August 1919.
  - 18) *Terauchi Masatake Kankei Monjo*, (寺内正毅関係文書) dated 22 September 1907; KS.
  - 19) *Mutsu Munemitsu Kankei Monjo* (陸奥宗光関係文書), dated 14 April 1894, KS.
  - 20) *SYKM*, KS, dated 25 May 1886.
  - 21) Oyama, YAI, pp. 59–60. The title is by Oyama.
  - 22) “Colonialism and the Korea Problem in the Historiography of Modern Japan: A Review Article,” *JAS*, vol. 59, 4, November 2000, pp. 951–976. See, “Communications to the Editors,” for reactions by Mark Peattie and Ramon Myers, for Schmid's response, *JAS*, vol. 60, 3, August 2001, pp. 813–816. Schmid may have been overly pessimistic about the size of the gaps. Two recent articles attest to the attention generated on the subject of Japan's relationship with Korea. See, Richard Devine, “A Japanese Rule in Korea After the March First Uprising: Governor-General Hasegawa's Recommendation,” *MN*, vol. 52, 1997, pp. 523–540; and Soon Won Park, “Making Colonial Policies in Korea: The Factory Law Debate, Peace Preservation Law, and Land Reform Laws in the Interwar Years,” *Korean Studies*, 22, 1998. An expanded version of the article is *Colonial Industrialization and Labor in Korea: The Onoda Cement Factory*, Cambridge, Harvard University Asia Center, 1999.
  - 23) Yamagata was *rikugunkyo* [(“army minister”) (陸軍卿)]. This translation is anachronistic, as is the rendering of *daijinko* (大臣公) and *bydo* (廟堂), as “prime minister” and “cabinet” respectively, since the modern cabinet system was not established until 1885. The translations are serviceable, nonetheless, since the posts, army minister [陸軍大臣 (*rikugundaijin*)], prime minister [(*soridaijin/shusho*) (総理大臣／首相)], and the cabinet [内閣 (*naikaku*)] established in 1885 evolved from the positions and the institution mentioned in the *ikensho*.
  - 24) This was an “army” in name only since the conscription system had been established only in January 1873, and there were even fears that it would have trouble in coping with rebellions by ex-samurai. See Yamagata's 1919 speech on the establishment of the conscription and local government systems cited earlier.
  - 25) The prime minister [大臣公 (*daijinko*)] was the *Dajodaijin* (太政大臣) Sanjo Sanetomi.
  - 26) The Japanese force, led by General Saigo Tsugumichi had landed in Formosa in late April 1874 and carried out a six-month campaign.
  - 27) Yamagata was the army minister [陸軍卿 (*rikugunkyo*)], but since he was not a councillor [参議 (*sangi*)], he was not entitled to participate in the debates on the question.
  - 28) Most of the troops had been withdrawn by

this time. The tenor here is ironic, with Yamagata in effect telling Sanjo that he had been presented with a *fait accompli*, and the inquiries at this time were untimely, to say the least.

- 29) The phrase used here is “*koi shiho ni furuu* (皇威四方に振う).” Taken out of context, the tone is aggressive. The very earliest imperial rescripts contained similar phrases, and it is hard to believe that anyone in the Meiji government believed that Japan was capable then, and at the time of Yamagata’s opinion, of making its weight felt abroad. See, for example, imperial edict dated 21 March 1868 in *Meiji Tenno Shochoku Kinkai* [(明治天皇詔勅謹解) (Exegeses of the Meiji Emperor’s Rescripts)], compiled, Meiji jingu (Tokyo, 1973), pp. 90–91.
- 30) His first tenure lasted from 8 June 1873–8 February 1874, and the second, from 30 June 1874–24 December 1878.
- 31) Yamagata may be referring to his *Gaisei Sansaku* [(外征三策) (“Opinion on the Three options on the Taiwan Question”)], July 1874. The first option he proposed was to withdraw troops from Taiwan and to restore diplomatic relations with China. The second was to be prepared to send an army to China; the third, to send reinforcements to Taiwan. On the basis of all of his words and actions in this period, there is no doubt that Yamagata considered as realistic only

the first option. See, Oyama, YAI, pp. 57–58 for the opinion. Yamagata, Ito Hirobumi, Tanaka Koken (田中光顯), Yoshikawa Ken-sei (芳川顯正), Mutsu Munemitsu, all high-level bureaucrats in the Meiji government who opposed the Taiwan expedition, formed an informal social club the *Yuhosha* [(友朋社) (Society of the Like-minded)], to discuss current events and cultural subjects. It had a brief life, from 1 May to 21 September 1874, but its existence was symptomatic of the passions created by the Taiwan question. Tokutomi Iichiro (Soho), [徳富猪一郎 (蘇峰)] *Koshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den*, Tokyo, 公爵山縣有朋伝, 1933, vol. 2, pp. 386–398. See also, Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838–1922*, pp. 71–76.

- 32) At this time, only the three cabinet ministers (*san daijin*) and councillors (*sangi*) could give advice to the emperor.
- 33) Yamagata is here saying that in order to cope with extraordinary occurrences such as wars and rebellions, peacetime long-range planning is necessary, and that this is of a higher priority. Since the Taiwan expedition is an accomplished fact, he cannot do anything about it. Still, should the decision be to expand it, he would regard it as a policy error since it would detract him from carrying out his basic convictions to prepare the military for true emergencies.

【要旨】歴史研究の基礎史料として、公文書のほかに私文書 (no-government papers) があるが、近代日本史研究、特に政治史の領域においては、書簡・日記・意見書・演説草稿あるいは個人に所蔵されてしまった公文書の草稿、政策メモなどを含む個人文書 (private papers) が重視され多用される。本論文ではこうした個人文書のうち「意見書」に着目し、日記や書簡と比較し「意見書」の性格を考察し、その史料的位置づけを試みる。検討にさいしては、多くの意見書を書いた山縣有朋を例として取り上げ、山縣有朋における意見書の意味を検討する。